

MR. CHILDS: Lets start off - are there any corrections in the resume of the last meeting? They went around as a proposed draft on problem one.

CAPT. OCKER: I haven't any corrections but I have a paper that I would like to introduce. It expresses our views on the old deal on which we are presently involved. And I have a feeling that we are off the railroad track. Maybe the thing to do is take a look at this rather than ~~xxxxxx~~ doing anything further and see if we can get back on the track. It covers our last meeting and generally why we think the present line of action is considered to be somewhat placed in the wrong place.

MR. CHILDS: These are not necessarily changes?

CAPT. OCKER: It is a little different from the existing It is internal CIA organization and it should come from the DCI.

MR. CHILDS: And for that reason they ~~want~~ think it should be done by ICAPS instead of the Standing Committee, as mentioned at the 22 July meeting.

CAPT. OCKER: What it would amount to is a reconsideration of the previous decision. I do think too, Press, that if this paper is accepted, whatever ~~modifications~~ ^{it would be a} may be introduced, if it should be used, ~~any~~ point of departure in which to prepare a formal charter, terms of reference, or something of that kind for both ICAPS and the Standing Committee so that when something came up like in the last IAC meeting that there would be no question about who should fall heir to that job. These are broad and what we consider should be done by each organization, each committee, and then it can be used to prepare for instance a formal charter. ~~for~~ For instance, the Joint Intelligence Group and the Joint Staff has a very definite charter which outlines their functions and duties and I think that a lot of the confusion about what ICAPS should do and what the Standing Committee should do arises from the fact that we have no such arrangement or such piece of paper which people can refer to when they want to make detail of some sort.

MR. CHILDS: Well, do you want to tack on this one view. Have

you seen it before?

CAPT. OCKER: All the NME representatives on the Standing Committee have seen it and agreed with it.

COL. BOOTH: I would rather first hear NME. Are they all agreed to that in the Military Establishment?

MR. CHILDS: That is what it says. "The Department of Defense representatives on the Standing Committee of the IAC submit the following comments and recommendations."

COL. BOOTH: That is all of them, then I think we are all set. I think the meeting is finished. We still like ours best, so we have a definite split to put before the IAC. I feel it is a duplication, except one very vital point. ~~I~~ The status of ICAPS. ICAPS, as I understand the writing, is going back in the same situation as it is now. They have two masters. They are working for the IAC and the Director. I don't think anybody can see two sides of a case, properly represent two sides. They are either working for the Director or they have to work for IAC, but they can't ~~be~~ supposedly be working for both of them at the same time.

COL. HAMMOND: My understanding was that our proposal was to have the ICAPS function under the Director of Central Intelligence, but coordinate as in a secretarial capacity with the IAC much as you described.

COL. BOOTH: Lets get the understanding as written the secretariat of the IAC. As a secretariat they will carry out the secretarial missions as assigned to it by the IAC. At the same time they will be directly under the Director of Central Intelligence. The only reason we have coordination is because we have the difference in the point of view. Otherwise, there would be no need for coordination, for secretarial work to straighten it out. You take one or ~~two~~ more agencies in the IAC that disagree with the Director of Central Intelligence and you give that to the ICAPS man to work on that from both ends of the stick. He is now for the Director of Central Intelligence and then for the particular member of the IAC who referred the question

he has to work as the IAC secretary, he has to carry out the IAC instructions and wishes. You have him in a dual position where he serves both the IAC and the DCI. Why should all of ICAPS be the secretariat, just the director as we propose.

COL. STATTLER: That is what we do propose. This is very ambiguous and Captain Ocker can explain it. We do not intend this as actually written.

COL. BOOTH: Then we may be in complete agreement.

CAPT. OCKER: That was not our intent. I realize that that particular part is very badly worded, but the first point is that ICAPS is going to have to do something about acting for the secretary of the IAC. As I recall it the subject was whether ICAPS would ~~xxxx~~ be termed an executive secretary, or what ~~kind~~ kind it was going to be. Now the ICAPS people have already started on one angle of the secretarial work of the Standing Committee by putting out an occasional status sheet before the Standing Committee on action which has not been completed. It is things like that and taking the minutes of the meeting which requires being a secretariat in the same status of the Joint Intelligence Committee. It works and operates for them.

COL. HAMMOND: Let's try and reword it. That statement.

MR. BUFORD: It is the procedure I am a little puzzled about because we were told that a paper prepared by my superior which represented his views the procedure was to see that it got to the IAC. I am not sure we are carrying out the injunctions of the IAC in returning the paper in this form which my boss thought was in proper form so he submitted it to the IAC. We have just touched on one part of it.

Capt. Ocker:
I think one of the reasons ~~xxxx~~ the decision was made by the IAC and it went to the Standing Committee is because we are very vague and foggy in determining what are the functions of the Standing Committee and what are the functions of ICAPS, and I am personally convinced it is on the wrong track at the present and I think the thing is to get the IAC straightened out and then put this back on the rail. I don't know whether it should be in the B&O or the Pennsylvania.

COL. BOOTH: There is a specific point I would like to see

corrected. You don't mean it the way you said it in your paper, and then, as far as I am concerned I have already considered the whole paper, then I say the only thing we have to do is refer the papers up to the IAC with the State Department still recommending that the IAC approve the sections as submitted, and the NME recommending that you take it as you outline it there, and the other part whichever way their conscience guides them.

COL. SKINNER: May I ask a question? The IAC considered the four problems - what do you believe the IAC should do with those?

COL. BOOTH: Just approve them.

COL. SKINNER: Then give them to the Director of Central Intelligence?

COL. BOOTH: The IAC agrees to three things. That is, on the first one it says that the CIA will do some things. First, that ICAPS will be a joint staff and that matters of coordination be referred to ICAPS for study and then that they representation on the Standing Committee be the same as that of the IAC and fourth that the CIA do certain things: a, b, c, d, e, f. And now on the second paper we recommend first that the IAC agree as to three points in the production of national intelligence estimates. And that the IAC discuss and approve all national intelligence estimates where there is substantial disagreement among the agencies or on the request of any member, and that ICAPS review and make recommendations for the procedures for the production of coordinated national estimates.

COL. SKINNER: But they would all go for unanimous. Suppose they are split?

COL. BOOTH: They may be and if they are split then they can't accommodate us. I see that after you got all finished they are still going to have the same sort of vote. You are handing it back to the IAC. The IAC will hand it to ICAPS. ICAPS will either write the same things or something similar, they will come to us again, we will go through the same procedure and hand it back to the IAC ~~FOR~~ for approval. We are going to start one more swing of the chain on the same papers. Now the Navy has expressed the point of view that the paper is in form

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to be submitted. I don't see how, after ICAPS gets through with it you may have some differences of opinion, but I don't see where you are going to have much difference in form, but recommend that the IAC approve something or disapprove and you will have down what you want approved or disapproved. If they are going to be different, that is not the form, but the substance.

CAPT. OCKER: I agree with you to this extent in this particular case I believe that if we will get the functions of ICAPS and the Standing ^{straightened out} Committee, we will not have these additional loops in the future. I feel that a case like this, and after all this whole thing ties into coordination, for my money. Coordination is a job which is assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence by law and all the rest of us can do is give him our advice. So I think anything, especially if it involves internal organization, which this does, should be worked over by his own staff before it is presented and that is why I think this whole thing is off the track. It has never been worked over by the persons who is really concerned,

COL. BOOTH: I can't really concede that. Here this committee report is months old and they have been in the hands of the Director since Mr. Armstrong presented them. They certainly have had plenty of time to know what their stand is by now. And they called the meetings to get our stand on it. A delay in taking a stand, I don't think we will be any better off taking a stand three months from now.

CAPT. OCKER: I don't know whether we approve or disapprove. The Director of Central Intelligence is free to accept those we reject and ~~accept those~~ reject those we accept.

MR. MacCARTHY: Of course he is, because the IAC is an advisory committee not a controlling one.

CAPT. OCKER: They have no executive authority.

COL. BOOTH: He has accepted it with a very very courteous suggestion to them that he might find it agreeable to pass it around and get the consensus of opinion and that is all he can do and he found it agreeable and submitted it to the members. I don't think he needs any

extra protection. He had a chance to stand up for his rights.

MR. CHILDS: He is willing to consider it, but he didn't say he would act the way it is recommended.

COL. BOOTH: Why should we come back and say we are treading on your toes, we are making a mistake?

MR. MacCARTHY: Mr. Chairman, the IAC met on this whole subject of the Standing Committee versus ICAPS and was discussed and those IAC members think that needs clarification, that is after they hashed it around for a few minutes and they referred it to the Standing Committee and this paper as item number one, what the Standing Committee recommends on the State Department recommendations. Now is this paper from the NME to be substituted for the Standing Committee action, which the committee asked for. Why not follow what the IAC said they wanted done on this thing and in bring up this problem that needs clarification, they asked for Standing Committee recommendations on these.

CAPT. OCKER: The objection I have to that is that ^{function} ~~it is~~ adding a lot of staff work which ICAPS should or is set up to do which the Standing Committee is not.

COL. BOOTH: I don't think we are justified in calling the whole function so that sooner or later we are following out their instructions. They told us to carry them out as we were and not as we hoped we would be and we have nothing else to do but come back with a recommendation.

MR. BABBITT: Can't it be taken this way, the first of the four proposals of Mr. Armstrong covers the subject of the paper which has just been handed in by NME and wouldn't it be possible for the Standing Committee to say on the first proposal from the State Department in regard to the ~~instructions~~ functions of ICAPS, coordination, after discussing it at the last meeting, this committee believes that the following: this paper is the proper way to handle it rather than the State Department proposals, which would call for the substitution of one paper for another, but it seems to me within the framework of this particular problem this way and if this gets approval of the IAC, ICAPS would take up the next three problems your way.

MR. BUFORD: The advantage is lost it seems to me. It will have to be taken up at this same table eventually, What in effect has been asked of this group is that it look at some proposed recommendations properly submitted by the Department of State and if they agree they can say they agree, and if they disagree they can say they disagree and in what respect and send it back to the IAC. That doesn't require much staff work.

COL. BOOTH: I think ICAPS has done considerable staff work. They have put out two memoranda. One a clarification of State's views, which had already been and then went on with a statement of the other peoples' views. What more staff work could you expect them to do? I think we ought to say we don't know whether we are for them or against them.

CAPT. GILBERT: The secretarial work is going to be done in ICAPS in any event. Do you think you should ^{preclude} ~~eliminate~~ the Chief of ICAPS from holding a round table discussion if he thinks it is going to be a more expeditious way ^{to} ~~and~~ get the job out. The only alternative is by issuing ~~memorandum~~ ^C over a long~~e~~ period of time. It is possible that might work under certain circumstances, but to get all the impressions in the shortest period of time there should be some provision for a round table discussion.

MR. MacCARTHY: And send it back to them and say the Standing Committee worked on this and there is a split and then append this paper and we ~~x~~ feel this covers the field and should be approved by the IAC.

CAPT. OCKER: The only objection to that, the fourth paragraph on which we blew up at the last meeting, pitchforks right into the internal organization of CIA and I don't think the IAC wants to be in it and I think they should be told what they are in.

COL. BOOTH: Why don't you say that Navy's viewpoint is that this is inappropriate?

MR. MacCARTHY: The Estimates Division?

CAPT. OCKER: And what kind of a vote do you get out of me?

What if the rest of the NME representatives go along with me and we

MR. CHILDS: The same as this one where State alone wanted an Estimates Division to do this. And that showed that everybody else was against it.

CAPT. OCKER: If the IAC says they want to monkey around in the internal organization of CIA, we will have to go ahead, but I don't think they do.

COL. BOOTH: But one member does, because one member, under his signature, submitted these very things that are inappropriate, so he wants to get into it. Now is it proper for our member to say no? And that is the chance we have now for your member to come up and say we shouldn't have come in.

CAPT. OCKER: If you are going to force the Standing Committee to continue considering things like that and if my boss, or several other peoples' bosses say I won't monkey with the internal organization of CIA, it strikes me that it comes to some sort of rump session between the ones that want to get into it and the ones that don't. I want to make a recommendation back to the IAC that this is in the wrong baliwick and see what the IAC says about it.

COL. BOOTH: Fine.

CAPT. OCKER: I think the IAC certainly has some responsibility and some concern in what the CIA does, but I seriously question as any business of CIA -

COL. STATTLER: You are not really telling them, you are recommending them.

COL. BOOTH: On the other hand, they also know the fact that the act has been done, that they have gone ahead and submitted these recommendations.

MR. MacCARTHY: The Director is also chairman of the IAC as written in the revised ASCLD No. 1. As chairman of the IAC he is fully acquainted with the State Departments recommendations, also ~~the~~ about the recommendations ~~in~~ on the Estimates Division and he was there as a party to the referral of that to the Standing Committee.

COL. STATTLER: In fact he pushed it.

COL. BOOTH: We can't correct that now.

MR. MacCARTHY: Don't fear that you are telling the Director.

He said give me your ~~xxxxx~~ advice.

MR. CHILDS: He didn't say he would accept them.

MR. MacCARTHY: State ~~it~~ doesn't say he is going to accept everything that goes up.

COL. BOOTH: The same argument may go on in the IAC.

CAPT. GILBERT: The State Department promulgated this paper and maybe they are getting into something that is none of their business, but just the same he said I want ^{the} ~~you~~ IAC agents^{to} to look into it, and he may not agree with the State Department man, but they did it and that is all they are asking for, ~~the~~.

CAPT. OCKER: He didn't ask their advice. He said what did they think of it.

MR. CHILDS: There was no discussion ~~on~~ and on the basis of ~~it~~ ^{decision} IAC we should go on with what they told us to do and incorporate this as part of it if you want or say we have taken up one problem and as a result of the discussion this is the recommendation and we want that approved before taking up the other three problems. This is primarily all on the first problem isn't it?

(State) MR. TRUEHEART: I have the impression that this Defense paper is ^{the same} essentially as the first three points in the State paper, it is simply a little more detailed.

CAPT. OCKER: Right.

MR. TRUEHEART: So I don't see why this couldn't be substituted for one two and three or as an appendix as what is meant by one two and three. This would then become the procedure in the future cases.

MR. CHILDS: Recommend that this be, that the Armstrong four problems be considered piece-meal by the IAC and this is the first piece.

MR. TRUEHEART: Why not finish up all four?

MR. CHILDS: I am ready to go on with the rewt, but I don't think the Defense people want to.

CAPT. OCKER: As ICAPS and ^{not} the Standing Committee was decided

At that point we part company because our contention is that the next point and how many of the next points are matters of internal organization of CIA, so as long as we head to that point we are through unless the IAC tells us to go on.

MR. TRUEHEART: You don't feel that they have already told us?

CAPT. OCKER: To quote a Biblical quotation: "Father they know not what they do."

COL. BOOTH: We think that is perfectly proper. but we think if you are going to make statements like that the Navy wants to make the statement and State Department is looking out for the general coordination of intelligence that it should be put down in black and white in an official matter. We think we are perfectly proper and we have the full backing of the Department and the right thing to do and we think we would be very derelict in our duty if we let things slip and didn't take part in the general coordination of the intelligence in the Government. I think it is one of the biggest responsibilities of the intelligence organizations has so we are quite opposite from the statement that they are messing into something that is not their affair. We don't agree with that, if you make that statement it should be made officially.

CAPT. OCKER: I have no objections to what the State Department ^{for} does. Whether it is ICAPS or the Standing Committee ~~is~~ consideration - that is the only point I have. What the State Department does as a State Department function, I don't care about that, but I don't think the Standing Committee should be handed something which is not a Standing Committee function.

COL. BOOTH: Well, now we have it.

MR. CHILDS: Even though the IAC said so.

COL. BOOTH: If we are deadlocked, we ought to send it back to the IAC for instructions that one member of the NME thinks it should not have been referred to the Standing Committee and we ask them to reconsider and think of sending it to ICAPS. That is a stand that could be taken too and if you wish to take it let's take it and get

the thing going. I don't agree with that stand. I think it is proper to refer it to the Standing committee and glad to see it acted upon.

CAPT. OCKER: That is what I think should be done.

CAPT. GILBERT: I think most everybody agrees that matters of coordination should be taken up here, but it is wasting the time of these people on matters that don't require their assembly here. It looks to me like the Director was misdirected and it did come. They only come together where their several interests are involved but here is a subject of internal organization of one organization. However, they got it.

MR. BUFORD: One member is trying to carry out his advisory-

CAPT. GILBERT: It depends on how far he wanted the Standing Committee to go.

COL. BOOTH: We are off the ~~question~~ track. The question is do we want to refer it or send it back to the IAC to send it somewhere else. We are getting nowhere. We need new instructions in view of the objection to handling it this way, ~~as now~~.

MR. CHILDS: I think we ought to finish up the first problem and and show that in covering this these other factors have come up and the Defense people think the remaining problems should be handled in a different way.

COL. ZELLER: This is just a request for instructions, and this is a report of progress to date.

COL. BOOTH: We can send it up right now ~~and~~ ~~and~~ recommend We have our stand. We say we that the IAC approve the recommendations in these four papers and you take the other stand that it is recommended the action outlined in your paper. That it is perfectly all right. Let's get the thing back to the IAC again

MR. CHILDS: How does that ride?

MR. TRUEHEART: Are you taking a vote?

MR. CHILDS: What do you think about it?

MR. TRUEHEART: I think this thing should be referred to ICAPS. However, it was referred to the Standing Committee. I think we should

finish the four problems before going back to the IAC.

MR. CHILDS: All four?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

MR. CHILDS: How about you Mr. Keay? Aren't you glad you have joined the IAC?

MR. KEAY: I am afraid I will have to be neutral. The difficulty being first that we have no direct interest and secondly, I am here just learning now.

MR. CHILDS: And you, Merritt?

COL. BOOTH: As I stated I think all four should be considered and that we recommend approval. Of course, I ~~have not~~ haven't seen anything offered in ~~this~~ roundtable discussion that could change my mind.

MR. CHILDS: And that means the NME does not want to do that?

CAPT. OCKER: It means this NME doesn't want to.

COL. HAMMOND: I am of the decided opinion that it is perfectly appropriate for us to take the actions recommended in this paper. When the four papers were handed down to the Standing Committee, the IAC, as I recall it, was to refer them to this committee to look over. It doesn't necessarily preclude our coming back to them with an interim recommendation, if as a result of our examination of those papers the interim recommendation did arise and we think that it would be helpful to get on the track in ICAPS and get a clarification from the IAC itself. On the other point which we raised here that it is internal organization, I personally don't see why it is inappropriate for the Standing Committee to take as it were an interim action in going back to the IAC itself.

CAPT. OCKER: I don't either. I don't feel that the IAC handed these papers to us with any statement that we had to approve or disapprove. It was given to us for consideration and if we decide that certain ones of them are outside of the perview of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, I think the Standing Committee is perfectly right to say so. We can be overruled ~~with any organization~~ that is our action and then the IAC can disapprove that and say go ahead and do as you were told originally.

We have come to the point now, or at least I think so, that the IAC after they got ~~in~~ down to paragraph 4 are going out of bounds. It is our consideration that they are going out of bounds and I think our actions is to say so.

COL. SKINNER: The DCI can read. They passed these on ~~in~~ to the Standing Committee and then we refer them back to the IAC members. That was the decision made.

CAPT. OCKER: These papers were never considered or discussed in the IAC. I think what we are stuck with, at least I think we are stuck, with ~~is~~ - I present my boss with what my views are on the particular paper and I ~~think~~ say we want to take part up to a certain point and after that we are off limits. I think I should ^{say} ~~be~~ so.

MR. CHILDS: Send it up and say in considering it the Standing Committee felt this, that, and the other way about the first three recommendation in the first problem and after that they felt that they were not the competent people to handle the rest of the papers.

CAPT. OCKER: Yes.

MR. BUFORD: It cuts as deeply into the internal organization as the Estimates Division~~x~~ on the first paper. The second paper refers to the results of the NSC ^{who} ~~which~~ commented upon by the Dulles Report. That paper also speaks of some of the Dulles Report recommendations. I don't think any of those last three papers go into the internal structure as much as the first one does. And the fourth is that ICAPS study and prepare recommendations for consideration by the IAC on the proper allocation of responsibility for political summaries, both daily and weekly.. So I don't see why this group can't pass on that paper.

COL. HAMMOND: Well, you feel then, Sid, that it is inappropriate. We have an extra loop in this particular matter in here, which we hope not to raise again. Do you feel, then, that it is inappropriate for that route that we recommend here ICAPS, inappropriate for the other papers too? We have rather felt that that routing or procedure ~~would~~ would be adopted procedure and say one for all matters that would come up that affect CIA.

COL. BOOTH: Not only for this, but for others~~as~~. As a matter

of fact I don;t think that route would be, I don;t think it is appropriate. We are denying the various intelligence agencies, the State Department, roundtable discussion and comment and considered opinion on a proposal that they have made for intelligence coordination.

COL. HAMMOND: What we really, in effect, had in mind was deferring that roundtable discussion, postpone the roundtable discussion here until the ICAPS staff agency of the Director of Central Intelligence has had an opportunity to examine it. Come up with just three comments and then you have your roundtable ~~discussion~~ discussion.

COL. BOOTH: We have those comments. We had the ICAPS comments circulated to all.

MR. CHILDS: Those were the things we picked up in the Department for clarification items.

COL. BOOTH: And each member has had these things for study. Each member. What actually has happened here the State Department asked its colleagues to think it over so we could get their opinion ~~and~~ and we are being denied an answer from any of the Departments. Instead of that, we refer them to another agency to work out something different. I don't think that is a sound system.. Any one member can offer an appropriate situation that is discussed among all four members, then it is handed to the Director as advice and then ~~xxxxxxx~~ that is the time that he uses ICAPS and ICAPS tells him and says no I will not go along with it. That is what ICAPS should be, his staff to advise him on that. Not to deny the State Department the benefit of the Navy's opinion. That is now being denied. The only place they can get it is in the Standing Committee.

MR. BUFORD: We have all recognized that the IAC in this capacity is acting in an advisory role. If you procede by the ICAPS route first, then the DCI in making his recommendations automatically ^{and} rejects or accepts things because it comes as advice and adopts it as he sees fit.

COL. HAMMOND: The way ~~xxxxxx~~ I see it, at the IAC meeting one or two members did propose ICAPS and Admiral Hillenkoetter said that it was his own staff and so he was going to refer it to what he felt

was the unanimous opinion.

MR. BUFORD: It came up and it was agreed unanimously.

COL. HAMMOND: Our point was that with a more specific clarification, which we believe we have all agreement on your first proposal, if there had been such clarification at the last IAC meeting, there would have been a more positive opinion among the members and would have decided to send it to ICAPS.

MR. BUFORD: I can't see your objections now ^{to} ~~that~~ our accepting ⁱⁿ ~~it~~ the charge ^{it} ~~was~~ given to the Standing Committee and ⁱⁿ ~~responding~~ to the ^{were} ~~State~~ Department paper ^{and} ~~with~~ comments/among those comments would be recommendations of the Military Establishment that they think this ^{because} ~~should~~ be referred to ICAPS, ~~but~~ they feel that some of the suggestions go too deeply into the internal organization. See what I mean?

CAPT. OCKER: If we are going to offer advice to the Director of Central Intelligence on internal organization, the Director had better get wise to himself. It is exactly this - somebody can come along and recommend that his organization be reorganized and he won't even comment on it and it goes to the IAC, he is forced lone-handed to go against the other members. In the first place the first time a business of reorganization ^{comes up and he} ~~as the~~ Commander-in-Chief of what he -

COL. BOOTH: The Commander-in-Chief in this case is the one that made a recommendation and worked on over a period and properly referred from the NSC to the Director to the members of the Advisory Committee and they are not going nothing more than carrying out his instructions. Now in a set case like that you can't advise him or any agency. You nullifying are ~~fulfilling~~ the whole system just as this NSC 50 claims the system is being nullified and certainly as you say took it out of the hat and on there own in spite of realizing whether that is presumptive or living up to their obligations or responsibilities. The President has set up a Board and the Board makes the recommendations and is approved by the NSC and it comes to the Director and he handed it out. There is nothing presumptive left to give your advice. If you won't give your advice then certainly you are falling down on your job of cooperating in the coordination.

MR. BUFORD: To follow it two steps further, the Director accepted it and sent it to the IAC for their advice and then is back responsible for referring it/to ~~the Standing Committee~~ this group for comment.

MR. TRUEHEART: In fact he even considered the fact of referring it to ICAPS and then rejected it.

COL. HAMMOND: Don't we have one real consideration at this stage or is it not appropriate for this Standing Committee to go back to the IAC with an interim recommendation?

CAPT. OCKER: I think so.

COL. BOOTH: I wouldn't myself feel that they carried out their duties fully. I don't see that they have any problem. The Committee is stretching the thing when they feel this is too delicate for it to be referred to them. What do you think about these things? We think that we don't need to be so delicate.

MR. MacCARTHY: At the 22 July IAC meeting Mr. Armstrong indicated that these problems were in the general field of intelligence coordination and as such he told them he would in this shape refer it to them and that was done subsequently and was voted to send it to the Standing Committee. The men ~~x~~ knew what they were referring.

MR. CHILDS: If we take care of problem one and refer it back to the IAC, that, at least, takes care of part of your desires and part of your desires as far as it goes, and all of the NME is that the -

COL. STATTLER: Are you talking about paragraph 4 of problem I?

MR. CHILDS: I think that has a good ~~make~~ deal to do with production too.

COL. HAMMOND: Supposing this proposal hadn't been put on the table here? Wouldn't it have been perfectly appropriate for the Standing Committee with four problems under consideration to submit them back to the IAC one at a time as they were finished quite aside from this? That seems to me as a matter of principle, it is perfectly logical if that is true then bringing this into the picture. Could we go back to the IAC on problem one, raising these points before taking up problems

two, three and four?

MR. CHILDS: Get the approval of the agreed position of problem one at least, the first three paragraphs.

COL. SKINNER: Take problem one and define what it means by research. Get the thing ironed out. It is a little confusing now.

COL. STATTLER: Merritt, here is my thought on this thing, let's take this review sheet ~~that~~ that under problem one paragraph three ^{from} regarding the Standing Committee. Now/our remarks we assume that we agree with this: "The Standing Committee recommends approval because this confirms in writing the existing situation. State, however, desires to have formal procedures and only one individual representing CIA instead of the ICAPS group." It seems to me that is rather incomplete for committee work. I think we should sit up here and the finished product should be a DCI, or revision of a DCI, or an NSCID. The point in my mind is whether this committee is prepared to do 1-1 regarding ICAPS. Who is going to perform this actual work that goes back to the IAC? Who is going to prepare the ^{amendments} ~~implementations~~ to the DCI's and to implement these things?

COL. BOOTH: Each person involved in most of them, the committee here, executed by the DCI. The ICAPS serves as a joint staff ~~under the~~ and responsible to the DCI, be composed of members contributed by the several agencies on a fulltime basis. I think that is done now. There was a time when one agency lacked a representative and I don't know but I don't think the FBI or the AEC has a representative in ICAPS.

MR. CHILDS: Nor JIB.

COL. BOOTH: If that is carried out the Director of Intelligence over here will have to send a member to the ICAPS. Except the such and such agency claims they don't have enough business to warrant a fulltime member.

COL. STATTLER: Who is going to prepare this paper implementing this?

COL. BOOTH: They will send a man over with the instructions that they will serve this way as well as ICAPS. A general bill of how it is going to serve. Now write out their detailed terms of reference and go forth.

MR. MacCARTHY: If the NME has any apprehension of CIA's functions being involved, why all this discussion about ICAPS, if they are recognizing it as an internal part of CIA?

COL. BOOTH: That is a good question.

COL. BOOTH: If that is your real objection, ~~xxxx~~ why is three-quarters of the time spent in telling them out to set up ICAPS?

MR. TRUEHEART: Suppose they say I want ICAPS to represent the agencies?

CAPT. OCKER: Some of these things the NSC 50 told the Director he could do and some he didn't have to do. / Somewhere along the line ~~we should set up the functions of the Standing Committee and ICAPS.~~ ~~to the same thing.~~

MR? MacCARTHY: Your Roman ~~xxxxxx~~ numeral two from State was specifically internal in CIA in that one of the four, the first point is that national intelligence applies only to intelligence that is interdepartmental in substance.

CAPT. OCKER: My mistake, I thought you were in CIA and not in State.

MR. MacCARTHY: We are discussing the subject in that I-a of what I just read.

CAPT. OCKER: There is only one thing I won't buy and that is paragraph 4. The other ones we have settled on and the last three I will buy without comment.

MR. MacCARTHY: Becasue they were internal and affected CIA?

CAPT. OCKER: Your four is the one that affects it.

COL. BOOTH: Why not say one, two, three approved. This is out of it.

CAPT. OCKER: What about the other ideas?

COL. BOOTH: Let's say no we don't want your paragraph four.

CAPT. OCKER: I have been waiting for somebody to vote on it.

COL. BOOTH: I voted before we started.

COL. STATTLER: We haven't been able to sell them on ~~ix~~ the paper. And we have ~~x~~ killed and hour and a half.

COL. BOOTH: Let's take a vote right now on both papers. Every-

body put in a vote of some sort.

MR. CHILDS: How about the first one? I would rather get the first one straightened out first. The first three points in the first paper under this except review instead of saying the Standing Committee met and reached an agreement on the following recommendations, except the Department of Defense which submitted the enclosed recommendations. The first three paragraphs. That first page is agreeable to everybody except the Department of Defense and in lieu of that the Department of Defense puts the paper in.

COL. STATTLER: I don't see much difference.

CAPT. OCKER: I tried to say a while ago that I think the Standing Committee and the ICAPS should have a charter. I want to see the functions of the two spelled out on green paper, or whatever color they use, and one of these days we can say it belongs to ICAPS or the Standing Committee and stop kicking it around. This may not be the answer that the DCI will approve for a proposal for ICAPS, but if he can buy that general idea for ICAPS then the Standing Committee functions will remain approximately as put in this. In other words, write a charter for both outfits.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't see why we can't approve them.

col. booth; The Standing Committee recommends approval of recommendations one, two, and three of State Department I and recommends that terms of reference be written for the ICAPS and the Standing Committee.

MR. CHILDS: In accordance with this new one?

COL. BOOTH: The suggestion is that the ICAPS prepare these terms of reference for submission to the IAC for approval.

CAPT. OCKER: I will buy that.

MR. MacCARTHY: If ICAPS is the staff to the IAC does it go to them for approval?

CAPT. OCKER: You people are in a position to do it. Somebody has to split the two jobs. We can come over here and try and find out. It is easier for you people to do it than for us.

COL. BOOTH: How about taking a vote on that - the three paragraphs?

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MR. CHILDS: And then submit those three before we go on to any more?

COL. BOOTH: Let's get as many more paragraphs out of the way as we can.

MR. CHILDS: That means we don't use that new paper?

COL. BOOTH: Not yet, but I don't see where we have any necessity for using it.

MR. CHILDS: What you dictated is to be in the report?

COL. BOOTH: Let's get these three.

CAPT. OCKER: Personally, I think this paper ought to go into them.

COL. JOHNSON: We could have the NME paper passed on for such consideration.

MR. CHILDS: I should think that would be part of the first three.

CAPT. OCKER: I think the Captain has in mind the other point.

COL. HAMMOND: It comes in your Roman numeral two.

COL. STATTLER: Any objections to 2-a on this paper?

MR. CHILDS: Is everybody in agreement with the first three paragraphs of Roman one? (Everybody agreed) In regard to paragraph four f Roman one?

MR. TRUEHEART: Before you go on - that doesn't mean these remarks in between go in?

MR. CHILDS: That is instead of these remarks.

COL. HAMMOND: The official paper is your original Roman one, two, three, and four?

MR. TRUEHEART: That supersedes the entire first page of the September 1?

COL. HAMMOND: Is it possible that the provisions of 4-b disposed of here and b covered in terms of reference or is that appropriate. I do not say by that that I am not trying to imply approval of these exact provisions and automatically be placed in terms of reference, but could the points that are brought up here be suitable for inclusion?

CAPT. OCKER: My feeling on number four is expressed generally in this paper. Here we have a memo to the Standing Committee and I think

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item four as far as I am concerned, my idea is that this paper go in instead of any comments of the NME on item four, paragraph 4 on the Estimates Division.

MR. CHILDS: Roman one, Arabic four.

MR. TRUEHEART: You agreed to most of them last time.

CAPT. OCKER: We dissented on it.

MR. BUFORD: Your objection goes beyond the Estimates Division on that?

CAPT. OCKER: I object to the Estimates Division. I objected to the original one. I prefer ORE as it is.

MR. BUFORD: Also the principles which are set up?

CAPT. OCKER: You say you outline principles. I think you are listing functions, detailed functions ~~in~~ in that case. I object to the concept of an Estimates Division.

MR. TRUEHEART: But not these functions being done by somebody?

CAPT. OCKER: I object to some of them.

MR. TRUEHEART: I thought we had a neutral wording.

CAPT. OCKER: Which means the same as the original.

COL. BOOTH: Can't we get right by saying the State Department recommends that paragraph four, Roman one be ~~changed~~ approved with amendments as follows: The words "research program" be deleted and substitute in lieu thereof "in respect ~~to~~ to intelligence production" The words "who is primarily" be deleted and substituted in lieu thereof an insert between "functions" and the word "of which."
"That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibility in respect to intelligence production primarily through the Estimates Division, a prime function of which should be such coordination in accordance with the following principles." a, c, d, and f remain the same, but paragraph b be changed to read as follows: "CIA will have free access to the intelligence production plans and programs of the several intelligence agencies, subject to departmental regulations and statutory requirements." State and any who wish to agree recommend approval as amended. The other recommendation that this particular question be referred to ICAPS for further study. Do you buy that?

MR. TRUEHEART: I would like to make a suggestion.

COL. BOOTH: And in connection therewith submit the following paper.

How is that?

COL. HAMMOND: Fine.

MR. BUFORD: If I understand, the Captain approves of these principles as being applicable to CIA, and doesn't want to put his finger in CIA organization?

MR. CHILDS: I think the other day you all agreed as written.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would like to say instead of dragging the Estimates Division in a subordinate class, make paragraph 4 ~~the~~ "The CIA will set up an Estimates Division as outlined in the Dulles Report" or something of that kind. Paragraph 5: "CIA should fulfill its responsibility in intelligence production in accordance with the following principles" and list them there and don't tie these principles up with the Estimates Division. I think we could get a much clearer indication of what people want if you separate those two things.

COL. SKINNER: ICAPS ought to take these principles and define them and make them clear cut.

COL. HAMMOND: I think the suggestion that you made would really accomplish that if we could make the statement that some of us feel that this should be referred to ICAPS and then pass forward on the other paper which sets out our views.

COL. BOOTH: I certainly would buy your suggestion, but I don't; but not the recommendation that it go to ICAPS. That more or less accomplishes your suggestion unless that would do away with the recommendation of sending it to ICAPS.

MR. TRUEHEART: It might do that.

COL. BOOTH: I certainly would by it.

MR. TRUEHEART: If everyone would agree to these five principles and get a clear cut statement as to what they felt about the Estimates Division whether they did like it or didn't like it, then you would have something you could send right up. I doubt whether ICAPS is

going to be able to write these principles in a more clear cut way.

COL. SKINNER: They have eight hours a day to do it.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't find them ambiguous.

CAPT. OCKER: Referred back to the IAC in accordance with these papers and no further discussion about it now. I won't buy the Estimates Division at all. I am not sure these are principles, I think they are functions and I practically admit I have not made a very extensive study of what they are, and I think it is up to ICAPS.

COL. STATTLER: Do you recommend sending it back to ICAPS and then submitting it to this Standing Committee only as a recommendation?

CAPT. OCKER: As a recommendation.

MRX MR. CHILDS: Splitting it into two parts?

COL. BOOTH: I am perfectly willing to do that.

COL. JOHNSON: I think it gives a better proposition to hand it to ICAPS that way.

COL. BOOTH: I will certainly by that as amended. Make a separate paragraph of the Estimates Division. Paragraph 4 should read: "That CIA ~~ESTD~~ establish an Estimates Division in accordance with the recommendations of the Dulles Report." Paragraph 5 should read: "That CIA fulfill its coordinating responsibilities in respect to intelligence production in accordance with the following principles."

MR. TRUEHEART: I am unwilling to vote for paragraph 4 until I know what the alternative proposal of CIA are to accomplish the same end, but I will buy five.

MR. CHILDS: There is a section in ORE, what do we call it? not an Estimates Division, but -

MR. BABBITT: The Intelligence Production Board, or the Global Survey Group. There is nothing to correspond with the fixed definition of an Estimates Division as far as I know at present.

MR. CHILDS: So that means it will be just a part of ORE's functions?

MR. TRUEHEART: He says he has been working on an alternative and

still hasn't been approved.

MR. BABBITT: It got as far as the Executive.

MR. TRUEHEART: The thing is that the NSC gave you a possible alternative. I wouldn't want to vote on either one until I knew what the two were.

MR. CHILDS: He has nothing contemplated like putting an Estimates Division in ORE.

MR. BABBITT: But we have an alternative to accomplish the same thing. There is a plan on the Executive's desk now and has been modified since ~~it submitted~~ it hit that desk and I can't go into the detail. I am sorry, but that is it. There is at present no approved solution.

COL. SKINNER: That is another reason why ICAPS should make the study. They can find out what CIA wants and submit the thing.

MR. CHILDS: I understand there would be no changes in the ORE. State alone wants the Estimates Division.

COL. BOOTH: Mr. Trueheart seems on the fence.

MR. TRUEHEART: I have to abstain from the Estimates Division until I know what the alternative is. You are against the Estimates Division?

MR. BABBITT: The alternative is no Estimates Division, I can tell you that.

COL. BOOTH: What objection do you have?

MR. ~~MR BABBITT~~ TRUEHEART: I don't have any objection to it but ~~HEHEHE~~ I understand CIA is against it.

COL. BOOTH: The fact they are against it without any good reason to be against it.

MR. TRUEHEART: That I don't know.

COL. BOOTH: The Dulles Committee thought they should have it.

MR. CHILDS: But NSC 50 didn't say so.

COL. BOOTH: But the NSC 50 was approved of the whole works.

COL. STATTLER: What has been ~~a~~ settled on the Coordinating Division?

MR. CHILDS: They are not going to do that because OCD ~~is~~ more

of a housecleaning function than ICAPS.

COL. STATTLER: I didn't like that phase of it.

MR. CHILDS: Everybody is opposed to 4-a, ~~xxxxxx~~ AEC abstaining except State. State alone wants the Estimates Division.

COL. BOOTH: They are not opposed, they want to refer it to ICAPS for further study.

MR. TRUEHEART: State is for 4 and everybody else recommends it go to ICAPS.

CAPT. OCKER: I am opposed to the Estimates Group, but my official action on this deal is what is in this paper. I mean, what I am trying to tell you, if we lose the battle and they tell us the Standing Committee has to do it, my standing will be I am against it. But now that I have an agreement with Trueheart, I would like to smoke CIA out of the hole and see both sides of the question.

MR. CHILDS: Their idea is no. That is what the Directors idea was a month ago.

MR. BABBITT: There will be no Estimates Division, that is clear.

COL. STATTLER: As contemplated in the paper?

~~XX~~ MR. BABBITT: In the NSC 50, the Dulles Report or any other.

CAPT. OCKER: We have taken the action, then you have the NME dissenting on it and the AEC abstaining.

MR. KEAY: And FBI abstaining.

COL. BOOTH: Refer it to ICAPS for further study.~~and~~

MR. TRUEHEART: Would you when that is referred to ICAPS incorporate the CIA alternative plan?

CAPT. OCKER: Officially I don't know that CIA has one.

MR. TRUEHEART: They must have according to NSC 50.

COL. JOHNSON: It is to be referred to ICAPS for further study and to ascertain the views of CIA?

MR. CHILDS: We have four down for the Estimates Division and five for the rest of that paragraph.

MR. CHILDS: State wishes to have them approved as written.

COL. BOOTH: And the rest referred to ICAPS for further study.

MR. CHILDS: The Estimates Division is paragraph 4, and 5 is the

list of principles.

COL. STATTLER: Now we are getting somewhere.

MR. CHILDS: Then that is what everybody wants to refer 4 and 5 to ICAPS, everybody but State. AEC and FBI abstains.

~~MR. CHILDS:~~

COL. STATTLER: But if ICAPS makes a study, he may change his mind.

MR. CHILDS: In connection with paragraph 4, do you want this new paper to go in?

COL. STATTLER: Paragraph 4?

COL. HAMMOND: Paragraph 4 and 5 were once one paragraph and that was our comment on that, can't we have our comment on 4 and 5?

MR. TRUEHEART: I can go along with 5 as written there.

COL. STATTLER: Take one off and add one and FBI still abstains. AEC goes along with 5.

CAPT. OCKER: You are trying to split this into two different jobs. I want to see that whole paragraph 4 go into ICAPS. My original vote ~~stat~~ has not changed a bit, regardless of these odd paragraphs. Paragraphs 4 and 4a to f I want referred to ICAPS.

COL. BOOTH: We will take your vote on that.

CAPT. GILBERT: I don't see that the Estimates Division makes any difference at all, you have agreed to the principles and ~~if~~ you ~~are~~ be ^{why should} concerned whether it is an Estimate Division or ORE as long as it is going to be done?

CAPT. OCKER: I don't agree with the principles that they are principles.

MR. TRUEHEART: Which one do you object to?

CAPT. OCKER: Those are functions.

COL. JOHNSON: Does this embrace everything?

COL. BOOTH: This has been going on with the NSC and the Dulles Report and ourselves. Who is going to study it any more thorough.

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't believe ICAPS can do much with it.

CAPT. OCKER: Let's vote on it.

~~that MR. TRUEHEART: help him to see that if these would accomplish things~~

MR. TRUEHEART: I think several of these ~~a~~ would accomplish things that would be very helpful to the agencies.

COL. BOOTH: Does CIA object to any of those?

MR. BABBITT: Yes, f.

MR. TRUEHEART: Even as a principle?

COL. BOOTH: You don't believe in helping out a man in need?

MR. BABBITT: Not even a cup of coffee.

MR. CHILDS: Nobody else wanted f the last time.

COL. BOOTH: Let's take a vote.

MR. CHILDS: I thought the vote was the four as well as the five will go into ICAPS.

COL. BOOTH: How many agree with State taking a new five altogether?

MR. TRUEHEART: I will buy State.

MR. CHILDS: State and AEC in favor of five as the principles? FBI abstaining in the case of four and the other in 4 recommending it go to ICAPS.

MR. MacCARTHY: Refer for a purpose?

MR. CHILDS: And the NME will submit this paper in connection with original four.

MR. TRUEHEART: You don't recommending sending it to ICAPS?

MR. CHILDS: We think "the center of information" is fine, "free flow" and all the rest of it and we would have the present "access to the plans and programs."

COL. HAMMOND: It seems to me we have a pretty clear cut recommendation.

CAPT. OCKER: I don't see why we beat our gums about it.

MR. MacCARTHY: Throw the recommendation into the hopper being referred to ICAPS and referred for a purpose.

COL. BOOTH: For further study.

CAPT. OCKER: And CIA comment.

MR. MacCARTHY: That makes it very interesting.

MR. TRUEHEART: CIA has already commented on it.

MR. BABBITT: We have hardly begun to comment.

MR. CHILDS: 1-e is the one that bothers us - the priorities. State has already agreed to DCI 3/1 and 2. We don't think that is coordination. And the first we didn't want the Estimates Division. That is out of it now, that is out of the five. Those are our only comments on it.

MR. TRUEHEART: What are you going to do?

MR. CHILDS: Refer it to ICAPS for study and comment and the NME paper.

MR. TRUEHEART: Refer it to ICAPS.

MR. CHILDS: As a statement of their position.

COL. STATTLER: You want paragraph 4 on that, don't you?

MR. CHILDS: Does that cross out problem one then?

MR. MacCARTHY: Do we understand what we are supposed to do?

MR. CHILDS: We are going to give them our comments, on e and f. We concur in all the ~~xxxx~~ others.

MR. MacCARTHY: CIA is going to give their comments on that?

COL. SKINNER: Objective study.

COL. BOOTH: We suggest that you adopt them this way.

COL. STATTLER: Constructive not objective.

MR. CHILDS: When we went through them before minus the Estimates Division. Now that isn't in five we don't know whether b refers to
4- security regulations; ~~xxx~~ c we concur in that; 4-d we concurred in that; 4-e we didn't know how priorities would set up under "existing programs". We get requests from the President and others and how are we going to fit them into them. State already agreed to DCI 3/1 and 2/1. ~~xxxx~~ f we do not agree because we don't think it a coordination problem

COL. BOOTH: Let's go to page 2. What are you going to do with that?

MR. CHILDS: We are going to concur in all of them except the last two or three. They can't listen, they can only read.

COL. SKINNER: They ~~xxxx~~ ought to be studies in connection with NSCID's and NSC 50.

MR. MacCARTHY: Take 5-b "access to the plans and programs."

If you recommend approval of that and the IAC approves it then the implementation factor the IAC may not approve it, but if they do, to my mind,, that would need a change in NSCID 1.

COL. BOOTH: It would require a change in NSCID 1 -is not it the fact that you add on to it does not require you to make it more broad.

CAPT. OCKER: I don't see why we sit here and tell ICAPS what to do.

MR. CHILDS: Will you want to take Roman 2?

COL. BOOTH: Any objection to that, gentlemen? If not, let's take that.

MR. CHILDS: We have been told that does not change from existing procedures.

COL. BOOTH: It clarifies a little bit some controversial ideas.

MR. BABBITT: I am not quite sure about that, except it would mean that, for instance, a matter of purely political substance could never be regarded as national intelligence. I ~~don't~~ don't think we can accept that.

COL. BOOTH: That is a very broad question. I say say as a general rule ~~there's~~ their might be.

MR. BABBITT: I want a loophole.

MR. BUFORD: You have crisis situations.

MR. BABITT: Only intelligence ~~what~~ which is interdepartmental in nature. That is, I mean, the substance.

MR. BUFORD: What is departmental intelligence? That which is produced by the departments for the use of the department?

COL. HAMMOND: Interdepartmental indicates that is has gotten into the field where it transcends the interest of one department and then it becomes interdepartmental and defines national intelligence.

COL. BOOTH: That is the definition as written.

MR. BABBITT: It affects the security of the United States directly and on a high level. That is national intelligence.

COL. HAMMOND: But you determined by whom?

MR. BABBITT: By the source.

MR. CHILDS: Do you lump into the crisis situations all of

DCI 3/1. In that 3/1 or something else?

MR. BUFORD: I don't.

MR. MacCARTHY: In DCI 3/1 normal, urgent, and exceptional circumstances.

COL. BOOTH: ~~Stack~~ Crisis is under exceptional circumstances.

MR. CHILDS: The same as exceptional circumstances.

MR. TRUEHEART: You mean if the President asked you for the location of a Russian submarine that would become national intelligence?

MR. BABBITT: It would depend on the variety of other circumstances.
It could be.

MR. TRUEHEART: What would throw it over the line?

MR. BABBITT: The whole situation and background.

MR. TRUEHEART: For example, a very critical relations with the Russians overall then such a request might be national intelligence?

MR. BABBITT: Naturally.

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CAPT. OCKER: We have already written up one split vote, why can't we do another one?

COL. BOOTH: If this is a ~~not~~ split.

MR. MACCARTHY: I think everyone agrees to what national intelligence is.

CAPT. OCKER: I didn't know that national intelligence was before the Board. I thought practically everybody let CIA write their dissent on it.

MR. CHILDS: CIA abstains. Everybody votes for 1a, b, and c, Roman 2. Arabic 1?

COL. STATTLER: I don't agree with c. "That no step be taken."

MR. CHILDS: Isn't that covered by DCI 3/1?

COL. STATTLER: Somebody has to take the bull by the horns.

MR. CHILDS: In the preparation of national estimates?

MR. BUFORD: Except in crisis situations.

MR. CHILDS: DCI 3/1 covers 1-c.

COL. BOOTH: All of them.

MR. BUFORD: We did manage an additional recommendation.

It seems to me have ICAPS make recommendations for procedures with DCI 3/1 as a procedural paper.

MR. CHILDS: You want that changed?

COL. BOOTH: If necessary. We haven't much to offer on that.

If you can iron out your system better, we will be glad to see that done. How about No. 2, are we all agreed on intelligence estimates where there is disagreement. Are you going to put a very considerable burden on the IAC?

MR. CHILDS: You want the IAC to meet whenever there is a disagreement and discuss it?

COL. BOOTH: I think this is in accordance with NSC 50.

MR. CHILDS: You don't think that is the lowest common denominator mentioned in NSC 50 that if the IAC members meet to discuss all intelligence estimates on which there is substantial disagreement. Won't the tendency be for them to water it down so there will be agreement?

COL. BOOTH: The main idea here is that they are going to have to take the responsibility if they are not in agreement and can't pass it on. If there is a substantial disagreement you want the bosses themselves.

MR. CHILDS: And the present procedure of dissents, the bosses don't get in on it?

MR. BABBITT: They forward their dissents and we publish it with the paper.

CAPT. OCKER: Because they get together and discuss their dissents does not necessarily mean that they are going to agree.

COL. BOOTH: You might change that word "approve" to "consider." To discuss and act upon.

MR. BABBITT: That gets away from the lowest common denominator.

MR. CHILDS: This does not mean the agencies, this is the members of the IAC themselves so that eliminates vote slips.

COL. STATTLER: You might be able to do it.

MR. CHILDS: If there is a substantial disagreement they have

MR. BUFORD: This gives the IAC a written obligation to come together.

MR. BABBITT: You can't discuss a substantial dissent by a voting slip.

MR. CHILDS: ² 1, ~~w~~, and 3 are voted on.

MR. KEAY: No, FBI did not vote on 1, 2, and 3.

MR. CHILDS: Do you think revisions are necessary under ~~xxx~~ 3?

COL. BOOTH: I think they can restudy. I think they can ~~not~~ clarify it.

MR. CHILDS: DCI 3/1. How about III-1?

CAPT. OCKER: I don't see how you can.

MR. CHILDS: The NSC determines, not the IAC.

MR. BABBITT: Yes, that is a definite change.

MR. CHILDS: The Act says it shall perform services of common concern that can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

COL. BOOTH: The IAC is going to have to submit their recommendations to the NSC.

MR. CHILDS: It goes through their Secretaries.

CAPT. OCKER: ~~xxx~~ Add "and approved by the NSC."

MR. BUFORD: That fixes it up.

MR. BABBITT: This gives the DCI the right to prescribe the fields of common concern, but that goes against the NSCID.

MR. TRUEHEART: Adding "and approved by the NSC."

CAPT. OCKER: I would recommend that paragraph 1 be chopped off with the word "concern" and say "on a priority basis ICAPS prepare" and the deletion of "common concern" "for further approval by the National Security Council. You say in the first place, the second paragraph tells how you establish a field of common concern.

COL. HAMMOND: Is that going to be a fixed change?

COL. JOHNSON: ICAPS is going to prepare of what common concern is. Couldn't that be incorporated into that?

MR. CHILDS: I don't see now how you can deleniate fields of common concern and we look upon them as services of common concern as the FBIB

and the Document Exploitation. Recommendation 1 is: "That, aside from national intelligence, CIA will produce intelligence reports only
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MR. BABBIT: Anyone like to ~~xxx~~ strike out the word "only."

MR. CHILDS: I know the Director won't buy that because he wants to meet the demands made upon him.

CAPT. OCKER: If we think that is the way it is let the Director sell it to the IAC.

MR. CHILDS: Leave out "as prescribed by the DCI on the advice of the IAC". Then paragraph 2: "That, on a priority basis, ICAPS prepare for consideration in IAC recommendations on the delineations of fields of common concern."

CAPT. OCKER: As further approved by the National Security Council.

MR. CHILDS: Do you think they will do that. I am thinking of the future. They have o.k'd the RBIB and the Document Exploitation and they will some other things.

MR. BABBIT: They are services.

CAPT. OCKER: Fields of common concern has been assigned by the National Security Act.

COL. JOHNSON: I will buy it as it is.

MR. CHILDS: For further approval by the NSC. I don't think
III
we can say the IAC. No other comments on 3? Now, Merritt, what is the idea on IV?

COL. BOOTH: I offer this much more ~~xxx~~ than I have before: if this is approved, Mr. Armstrong will support and endeavor to get some part of the State Department Political Summaries made available for circulation, which should replace a great deal of the present daily ~~and~~ summaries.

MR. CHILDS: And the weeklies?

COL. BOOTH: As far as the daily is concerned I don't know that we have much more to offer. The daily is frequently replica of stuff that go into our daily summary. Sometimes you have a comment on that might be the opposite comment of the man who actually received the thing and had to act on it.

MR. CHILDS: One is State Department policy and the other one isn't.

CAPT. OCKER: I thought this was whether we want to turn it over to ICAPS or not.

MR. CHILDS: I can give you ICAPS answer on the daily. That is done for the President by request. On the weekly, it is the only weekly you don't produce it that is the State policy group and you want to make that available to us for our use?

COL. BOOTH: And we might also give the State Secret Daily, which would be a good thing. I can't answer that definitely.

MR. CHILDS: And they are not 100% political - our daily and ~~weekly~~ weekly.

COL. BOOTH: Damn near.

MR. CHILDS: We will see what comes out of this.

COL. STATTLER: FBI abstains from the last one?

MR. KEAY: Yes.